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ABSTRACT
We  p r ovi de novel  em pir i cal evidence on t he eff ects of fi nanci al restr aint s on Sout h 
Ko r ean fi nanci al devel opm ent .   The evidence i s li nked t o a si mp l e m odel  of the 
Ko r ean banki ng system  that  encapsulates it s cart eli sed nat ure, wh i ch predicts a 
posi t i ve associati on bet w een f i nanci al  devel opm ent   and ( i )   t he degree of  state contr ol
over t he banki ng system , (i i )  mi l d repression of l endi ng rates.  The m odel  also 
predicts that  in t he presence of lendi ng rate contr ol s, increases in t he l evel of the 
adm ini stered deposi t  rate are unl i kel y t o i nfl uence fi nanci al deepening.  We  t est the
m odel  em pir i call y by const r uct i ng i ndi vi dual  and su mma r y m easures of f i nanci al
r estr aint s.    Ou r   em pir i cal  f i ndi ngs are consi stent  wi t h our  t heoreti cal  predicti ons but  
cont r ast sharpl y w i t h t he predicti ons of earl i er li t erature that  post ul ates that  int erest
r ate ceil i ngs  and  ot her  f i nanci al  r estr aint s const i t ut e sources of  ‘ f i nanci al  r epression’.  
K ey w ords:  Fi nanci al   deepening,   f i nanci al   restraint s
JEL classif i cati on:  O1 6 ,   G1 8 ,   G2 8 .2
FI NANCI AL  RESTRAI NTS  IN  THE  SO UTH   KOREAN  ‘ M I RACLE’
1. Int roduct i on
I nvest me n t   r ates t hat   averaged 25%   of  GDP  and  average per  capit a grow t h  r ates exceeding  6. 0 
per  cent  per  year  duri ng 1960-95 t r ansforme d   Sout h Ko r ea f r om  a r elati vel y underdevel oped 
state int o a hi ghl y i ndust r i ali s ed econom y w i t h l i vi ng st andards com parable to t hose in m any 
We s t ern count r i es.  Wh i l e expl anati ons of  t hi s ‘ mi r acle’  abound ( e.g.   Wo r l d Bank,   1993),   t he 
i m port ant  quest i on of  wh a t   we r e t he eff ects of  pervasi ve governm ent   i nt ervent i on  i n  t he  f i nanci al 
system  i s sti l l   unansw ered.  Be s i des  i t s signi f i cant  r elevance f or  pol i cy ma k e r s i n  ot her  devel opi ng 
count r i es,  t hi s quest i on i s also centr al  t o t he academ ic debat e concerni ng t he benefi t s and costs 
of  f i nanci al  l i berali s ati on ( Mc Ki nnon,   1973;   Shaw,   1973;   Fr y,   1995;   Fr y,   1997;   St i gl i t z,  1994;  
St i gl i t z,  1998;   Si ngh,   1997;   Ar esti s and  De me t r i ades,  1999).  
I n t hi s paper  we   provi de novel   em pir i cal  evidence on t he eff ects of  f i nanci al  r estr aint s i n Sout h 
Ko r ea,  wh i ch sheds new  l i ght   on t he m echanis m  of  f i nanci al  deepening.     Thi s   evidence  i s   l i nked 
t o a si mp l e m odel  of the K orean banki ng system  that  encapsulates it s cart eli sed nat ure. The 
m odel   predicts a posi t i ve associati on bet w een f i nanci al  devel opm ent   and ( i )   t he degree of  state 
cont r ol   over  t he banki ng system ,  ( i i )   mi l d r epression of  l endi ng r ates.    I t   also predicts t hat   i n t he 
presence of lendi ng rate contr ol s, increases in t he l evel of the adm i ni stered deposi t  rate are 
unl i kel y  t o  i nfl uence  f i nanci al  deepening.   We   t est   t he  m odel   em pir i call y  by  const r uct i ng  i ndi vi dual  
and sum m ary m easures of fi nanci al restr aint s, ut i l i sing t he m et hods advanced by D em et r i ades 
and Lui nt el  ( 1996a,   1996b,   1997).     Ou r   em pir i cal  f i ndi ngs are consi stent  wi t h our  t heoreti cal 
predicti ons but  cont r ast sharpl y w i t h t he predicti ons of earl i er li t erature that  post ul ates that  
i nt erest rate ceil i ngs and ot her fi nanci al restr aint s const i t ut e sources of ‘f i nanci al repression’,  
cont aini ng  f i nanci al  devel opm ent   and  i nvest me n t .  
The paper is str uct ured as fol l ow s.   Secti on 2 provi des a bri ef  overvi ew  of  r elevant  l i t erature 
and  expl ains  w hy  Sout h  Ko r ea i s an i nt eresti ng  case study.     Secti on  3  put s f orwa r d  a t heoreti cal 
f r am ew ork for analysi ng t he eff ects of f i nanci al r estr aint s on Sout h K orean fi nanci al
devel opm ent .   Secti on 4 presents the econom et r i c m odel  and di scusses esti ma t i on i ssues.
Secti on 5 expl ains t he const r uct i on of  t he m easures of  f i nanci al  r estr aint s and out l i nes t he dat a 
sources. Secti on 6 presents the m ai n em pi r i cal result s
1.   Final l y,  secti on 7 sum m ari ses and 
concludes.
1  A  f ul l   set  of  r esult s i s provi ded  i n  t he  wo r ki ng  paper  version  of  t hi s paper,   De me t r i ades  and  Lui nt el 
( 1996c).3
2.   Fi nanci al   Re s t raint s and  Econom i c  Gr o wt h:   The  Sout h  Kor e an  P uzzle
M any devel opi ng count r i es duri ng t he 1960s and 1970s,  i ncl udi ng Sout h K orea, adopt ed 
pol i cies that  restr i cted the fr eedom  of fi nanci al int erme d i ari es to det ermi ne i nt erest rates and 
all ocate l oanabl e f unds.   The  ma i n i nt enti on of  t hese pol i cies wa s   t o secure l ow  cost  f i nance f or 
i ndust r i es t hat   we r e deem ed i m port ant  f or  econom i c grow t h.   Such  i nt ervent i oni st  pol i cies we r e 
seen t o  const i t ut e sources of  ‘ f i nanci al  r epression’  by  a vol um i nous  l i t erature ( Mc Ki nnon,   1973;  
Shaw,  1973;  Fr y,  1995).   A ccordi ng t o t hi s li t erature, i nt erest rate ceil i ngs,  hi gh reserve 
r equi r em ents and di r ected credit  progra mme s  i nhi bi t  the devel opm ent  of the banki ng system  
and,  as a result ,  reduce bot h t he vol um e and product i vi t y of invest me n t  (Mc Ki nnon,  1973;  
Shaw,   1973;   Ga l bi s,  1977;   K apur,   1976;   Ma t hi eson,   1980;   Fr y,   1978,   1995).     Thi s l i t erature 
has  been i nfl uent i al  i n s hapi ng f i nanci al  r eforms   i n m any LDCs ,   not   l east   because t he Br ett on 
W oods i nst i t ut i ons em braced i t s concl usi ons.     Thus,   a t ypi cal  com ponent   of  str uct ural  r eforms  
encouraged by t he I MF   and t he Wo r l d Bank has been t he ‘ l i berali sati on’  of  f i nanci al  ma r ket s.
To t hi s end,  i nt erest r ate restr i cti ons w ere li f t ed, state banks pri vat i sed and governm ent
i nt ervent i on  i n  t he  all ocati on  of  l oanabl e f unds  di scouraged.
The f i nanci al repression l i t erature encount ered a great deal of cri t i cism
2.     On e   l i ne of  cri t i cis m 
em phasi ses t he  i m port ance of  str uct ural  consi derati ons  such as unoff i cial  credit   ma r ket s ( Tayl or,  
1983).  These are capable of reversing t he concl usi ons of Mc Ki nnon/ Shaw:  an int erest rate 
i ncrease i n t he off i cial  ma r ket   ma y   not   r aise i nvest me n t   i f   t he i ncrease i n bank deposi t s crow ds
outcurb ma r ket   l oans
3  ( Va n   Wi j nbergen,   1983).   A not her,   mo r e r ecent,   l i ne of  cri t i cis md r aw s
on t he experi ence of  several  unsuccessful   l i berali sati on episodes,   part i cularl y i n Lat i n Ame r i ca 
( e.g. D i az-A lejandro,  1985;  Vi l l anueva and M i r akhor,  1990).   Em phasi s i ng t he rol eo f
i mp e r f ect informa t i on i n fi nanci al ma r kets, these cri t i cs argue t hat   hi gh dom est i ci nt erest  r ates,
wh i ch usual l y fol l ow  fi nanci al l i berali s ati on, i ncrease adverse selecti on and m oral hazard
probl em s in credit  ma r ket s (St i gl i t z, 1994).   Thus,  int erest rate restr i cti ons m ay i nadvert entl y
have benefi cial consequences on t he st abil i t y and soundness of the banki ng system ,  r educi ng 
f i nanci al  f r agil i t y and preventi ng cri s es  ( St i gt l i t z,  1998).   On e   m echanis m  t hrough wh i ch t hi s   ma y  
occur is higher bank fr anchise values,  wh i ch encourage prudent  behavi our by banks ( Ca pr i o 
and  S u mme r s,  1996;   He l l m ann,   Mu r dock  and  St i gl i t z,  2000).
The  Sout h  Ko r ean experi ence wi t h  f i nanci al  r epression  i s part i cularl y  i nt eresti ng  and  r elevant  f or 
ot her  LDCs   not   l east  because i t   coinci ded wi t h a peri od of  r apid econom i c devel opm ent .     I n 
s pi t e of  payi ng l i p s ervi ce t o t he benefi t s   of  f i nanci al  l i berali s ati on s i nce t he mi d-1960s,   unt i l   very 
2  For   a  r ecent  cri t i cal  overvi ew   of  t he  l i t erature  see  Ar esti s and  De me t r i ades  ( 1997).
3  Som e  evidence  of  t hi s t ype  of  crow di ng  out   i n  t he  case  of  Sout h  Ko r ea  i s presented  by  Edwar ds  ( 1988).  4
r ecentl y t he Sout h K orean governm ent  int ervened ext ensivel y i n t he pri cing and al l ocati on of 
credit .   Specif i call y,   i t   ensured t hat   pri ori t y  sectors,  ma i nl y  export -ori ented i ndust r y  such as steel,  
electr oni cs, ship-bui l di ng,   autom obi l e m anufacturi ng etc.,   r eceived preferenti al  t r eatme n t   as f ar 
as access to i nexpensi ve bank credit  w as concerned.   Besi des ext ensive di r ected credit
progra mme s ,   t he Ko r ean Mi ni str y of  Fi nance i m posed cont r ol s coveri ng t he enti r e str uct ure of 
deposi t   and  l endi ng  r ates.
The Sout h K orean att em pts at fi nanci al reforms  in t he m i d-si xt i es w ere aime d ,  accordi ng t o 
Wo r l d Bank (1989),  at i ncreasing t he rol e of t he m arket  i n t he fi nanci al syst em . Ma n y
c o mme n t ators,  how ever,   di sput e t hat   t he  r eforms   r educed t he  r ol e of  t he  state i n  t he  process of 
f i nanci al  i nt erme d i ati on.     Ha r r i s ( 1988),   f or  exam ple,  poi nt s out   t hat   t hest eep r i se i n  r eal  i nt erest 
r ates wh i ch t ook pl ace i n t he sixti es wa s   not   t he out com e of  ma r ket   f orces but   wa s   engi neered 
by t he m onet ary authori t i es of  Sout h Ko r ea wi t h a vi ew  t o t appi ng t he f unds pl aced i n t he curb 
ma r ket .   The subst anti al infl ux of funds fr om  t he curb m arket  to t he banki ng system , wh i ch 
f ol l ow ed t he r i se i n i nt erest  r ates, enabl ed t he  state t o  i ncrease i t s cont r ol   over  dom est i c saving.  
Som e  r elaxati ons of  governm ent   cont r ol s t ook pl ace i n t he l ate sevent i es wh i l st  t he l ate eight i es 
and earl y ni net i es saw  a mo r e det ermi ned  m ove  t ow ards  mo r e l i beral i sed condi t i ons.     Ho we v e r ,  
even the reforms  o f  t he l ate eight i es are not unam bi guousl yi nt erpreted as ‘f i nanci al
l i berali s ati on’.  A m sden and Euh (1993),  f or exam ple, poi nt  out  t hat  wh i l st governm ent
i nt ervent i on  has  been l ess vi sibl e,  i t   r em ained  di screetl y  present,   albei t   i n  a di f f erent  f orm.     I t   wa s  
not  unt i l  the m i d-ni net i es that  Ko r ea relaxed all  int erest rate contr ol s and t hen proceeded to 
l i berali s e capit al  f l ow s
4.
The com plexit y of t he Sout h K orean experi ence has m eant t hat  i t  has proved di f f i cult  t o
establi sh t he eff ectso f   f i nanci al restr aint s on the process of econom i c grow t h.   D id fi nanci al 
r estr aint s cont r i but e to t he m i r acle, or coul d grow t h have been even faster  wi t hout   i t ?   Par k 
( 1994),   f or  exam ple,  argues t hat   f i nanci al  r epression di d not   hinder  grow t h  but   i s unabl e t o  off er 
any corr oborati ng evi dence
5.On e  i m port ant channel t hrough w hi ch fi nanci al rest r aint s  ma y
i nfl uence econom i c grow t h i s f i nanci al  devel opm ent .     By  presenti ng new  evidence on t he eff ects 
of fi nanci al rest r aint s  on fi nanci al   devel opm ent ,   t he r est  of  t hi s paper  ma k e s   an i m port ant  step 
t ow ards  r esolvi ng  t hi s puzzle.
4  I t   i s now   wi del y  argued  t hat   t he  l i berali sati on  of  capit al  f l ow s  wa s   one  of  t he  f undam ent al  f actors behi nd 
t he  As i an  cri sis ( De me t r i ades  and  Fat t ouh,   1999).
5Wo r l d  Bank  ( 1993)  argues  along  simi l ar  l i nes:
".. . i t   i s very di f f i cult   t o establi sh stati sti cal  l i nks bet w een grow t h and a specif i c i nt ervent i on 
and  even  mo r e  di f f i cult   to establi sh causali t y".     ( Wo r l d  Bank,   1993,   p.   6).5
3. Theoret i cal  Fram ework
3. 1.   The  Mc Ki nnon  Shaw  Approach
I n t he Mc Ki nnon/ Shaw  l i t erature t he basi s f or  t he r elati onshi p bet w een f i nanci al  and econom i c 
devel opm ent   i s G url ey and Shaw ' s (1955) debt -int erme d i ati on hypot hesi s.   Thi s hypot hesi s
states t hat   an i ncrease i n  t he  m oney  stock  r elati ve  t o  t he  l evel  of  r eal  econom i c acti vi t y  i ncreases 
t he extent  of  f i nanci al  i nt erme d i ati on,   wh i ch,  i n  t urn,   r aises product i ve  i nvest me n ta n dpe r -capit a
i ncom e
6.   In t his l i t erature, nom i nal  int erest rate contr ol s inhi bi t  capit al accum ulati on because 
t hey reduce the real rate of return on bank deposi t s, thereby di scouraging fi nanci al saving.  
Fur t hermo r e, hi gher r eserve requi r em ents also exert  a negat i ve i nfl uence on fi nanci al
i nt erme d i ati on by i ncreasing t he w edge bet w een lendi ng and deposi t  rates. Thus,   hi gher  r eal 
i nt erest rates encourage capit al accum ulati on and real econom i c acti vi t y,  l argel y t hrough an
i ncrease in t he ext ent of fi nanci al i nt erme d i ati on
7.M or eover,   t hi s l i t erature also predicts t hat  
hi gher real int erest rates have a posi t i ve eff ect on t he average product i vi t y of the aggregate 
capit al stock by di ssuading i nvest ors fr om  i nvest i ng i n l ow  return proj ects (Fr y,  1995;  Wo r l d
Bank,   1989).
3. 2.The  M onopol y Bank  M odel
I n t he M cK i nnon/ Shaw f r am ew ork banki ng i nst i t ut i ons,  wh i ch presum ably i nt erme d i ate
bet w een savers and i nvest ors, arei mp l i cit l ya s s u me d   t o operate under perf ectl y com peti t i ve 
condi t i ons t r ansformi ng deposi t s i nt o l oans at  zero cost  ( Mc Ki nnon,   1981 or  Fr y 1978,   1980,  
1995). W e have argued el sew here (De me t r i ades and Luint el,  1996a,  1996b) that  perf ectl y 
com peti t i ve m odel s of  banki ng are i nappropri ate f or  exam ini ng t he eff ects   of  f i nanci al  pol i cies.
At  the t heoreti cal l evel,   t r eati ng t he banki ng system  as perf ectl y com peti t i ve l eaves l i t t l e r oom  
f or analysi ng t he behavi our of banks and t hei r  reacti on t o governm ent  i nt ervent i ons.  Mo r e
i m port antl y,   t hi s assum pti on i s not  reali sti c:   i n m any LDCs   t he banki ng i ndust r y i s   dom i nat ed  by 
a sm all  num ber of banks and col l usi ve behavi our is not  uncom m on ( see Fr y,   1995).   A not her 
i m port ant  source of  i mp e r f ectl y com peti t i ve behavi our  i n banki ng i s t he presence of  i mp e r f ect 
6 I n  cont r ast,   i n  Mc Ki nnon' s ( 1973)  f orma l   m odel   f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons do  not   i nt erme d i ate bet w een savers 
and  i nvest ors becausem oney  i s of  t he  ‘ out side’  t ype  i . e.  l oans  t o  t he  governm ent .     I n  Mc Ki nnon' s  m odel   all  
i nvest me n t  is self - f i nanced and i ndi vi sibl e.    I n t hi s cont ext  t here i s com plem entari t y bet w een m oney and 
capit al,  wh i ch ari ses because econom i c agents have t o accum ulate m oney bal ances before they can 
undert ake  l um py  i nvest me n t   proj ects. 
7 Ext ensions  of  Mc Ki nnon/ Shaw  are t ypi call y  based  on  t he  debt - i nt erme d i ati on  hypot hesi s.    I n  t he  papers 
by  K apur  ( 1976)  and  Ma t hi eson  ( 1980)  l i berali sati on  wo r ks  t hrough  an  i ncrease  i n  t he  suppl y  of  credit   wh i ch 
raises invest me n t  wh i ch in t urn rai ses output  and grow t h.     I n Ga l bi s ( 1977)  hi gher  r eal  i nt erest  r ates shif t  
f unds fr om  t he t r adit i onal  low- product i vi t y  sector  t o  t he  banki ng  system  wh i ch t hen  channels t hem   on  t o 6
i nforma t i on.   A sy mme t r i c informa t i on i n l oan m arket s  i s  i n fact suff i cient to generate som e 
degree of  ma r ket   pow er  f or  l enders w ho  w oul d  t hen  be  able t o  act  as  i f   t hey  we r e m onopol i sts 
i n r elati on t o t he pool   of  pot enti al  borr ow ers t hat   are att ached t o t hem  t hrough l ong-t erm  bank-
custom er  r elati ons  ( St i gl i t z,  1994).
De p a r t ure of  t he benchm ark m odel   f r om  perf ect  com peti t i on has i m port ant  i mp l i cati ons f or  t he 
wa y   i n wh i ch fi nanci al  r est r aint s   aff ect  f i nanci al  devel opm ent.     Consi der  t he  case of  a m onopol y 
bank facing deposi t  r ate contr ol s.  Thi s coul d be t hought  of as eit her the onl y bank i n t he 
econom y – a bank cart el - or,  perhaps m ore reali sti call y,  as a representati ve bank w hi ch 
behaves as a m onopol i st in relati on t o t he pool  of it s long-t erm  borr ow ers,  as suggest ed by 
St i gl i t z (i bi d. ) .  Thus,  the representati ve bank has perf ect informa t i on about  it s ow n borr ow er 
base  ( and  no  i nforma t i on  about   t he  borr ow er  base  of  ot her  banks  t o  w hom   i t   r efuses  t o  provi de 
l oans).   A ssum e t hat   t he  bank  has  access t o  a t echnol ogy  t hat   all ow s  i tt o  i nfl uence  t he  vol um e  of 
deposi t s wi t hout   having t o change the deposi t   r ate.   Thi s   t echnol ogy ma y   i ncl ude acti vi t i es  s uch 
as varyi ng t he num ber  of  bank branches and/ orm arket i ng  and  i s   ass um ed  t o  exhi bi t   di mi ni s hi ng 
r eturns.     Thi s assum pti on i s not   i mp l ausibl e:  doubl i ng t he num ber  of  bank branches or  ma r ket i ng 
expendi t ure i s unl i kel y t o l ead t o a doubl i ng of  t he vol um e of  bank deposi t s.    E ssenti all y,   wh a t  
we   are assum ing here am ount s t o adm it t i ng t he presence of  som e savings out side t he banki ng 
system  t hat   coul d be att r acted t o t he banki ng system  not  onl y t hrough hi gher  deposi t   r ates but  
als o t hrough an i mp r ovem ent  i n t he non-pecuni ary at t r i but es of bank deposi t s (such as
i ncreased conveni ence or  l ow er  shoe-l eather  costs).
Di agram ati call y,  the deposi t  coll ecti on t echnol ogy i s sum m ari sed in Fi gure 1  by an upw ard 
slopi ng ma r gi nal   cost  schedul e f or  coll ecti ng l oanabl e f unds.     Fi gure 1 also depi cts a dow nw ard 
slopi ng dem and f or  bank l oans along wi t h t he associated ma r gi nal   r evenue curve.   The  slope of 
t he dem and schedul e for bank l oans refl ects the avail abi l i t y and conveni ence of  subst i t ut es t o 
bank l oans,   such as curb ma r ket   l oans
8.     The  m ono-bank ma x i mi s es  profi t   by s electi ng l endi ng 
r atei
m at  wh i ch t he vol um e of  l oans  i s  L
m.     A ssum e now  t hat   t he authori t i es i m pose a l endi ng 
r ate ceil i ng at  t he l evel i 1.  The  ma r gi nal   r evenue curve now  becom es f l at  up t o poi nt   A  wh e r e 
t he ceil i ng rate m eets the dem and curve and drops off  to m eet the ori gi nal  ma r gi nal  revenue 
curve at  poi nt   B  aft er  wh i ch t he t wo   curves coinci de.     The  profi t   ma x i mi sing posi t i on i s one i n 
wh i ch L 1,   t he  new   vol um e  of  l oans,   i s   hi gher  t han  wi t hout   t he  ceil i ng.     Thus,   t he  i m posi t i on oft he
l endi ng rate ceil i ng by t he authori t i es raises the vol um e of bank l oans (and deposi t s).   N ote, 
t he  m odern    sector  wh i ch i s mo r e product i ve.     Thus,   t he  eff ects of  f i nanci al  deepening  on  t he  r eal  econom y 
wo r k  t hrough  t he  average  eff i ciency  of  i nvest me n t .
8  The  curb  l oan  rate  i s assum ed const ant  t hroughout   t hi s analysi s.7
i m port antl y,  that  the l endi ng rate ceil i ng does not  lead to credit  rati oni ng,  in cont r ast to t he 
Mc Ki nnon/ Shaw case.  Thi s r esult   hol ds t r ue as l ong as t he l endi ng r ate ceil i ng r em ains above 
t he com peti t i ve l evel i
c.     Ce i l i ngs bel ow  i
cr esult   i n som e credit   r ati oni ng because i t   i s no l onger 
possibl e for t he bank t o sat i sfy t he dem and for credit  wi t hout  t he m argi nal  cost of funds 
exceeding t he m argi nal  revenue.  N ote, how ever,  that  unl ess the ceil i ng i s placed below  t he 
ma r gi nal   cost  of  f unds at L
m,   t he vol um e of  bank credit   r em ains above t he m onopol y l evel.   For  
exam ple,   a l endi ng r ate ceil i ng at  i 2  r esul t s   i n  a l ow er  l evel  of  f i nanci al  i nt erme d i ati on.     Thus,   mi l d 
r epression  of  l oan  r ates i ncreases t he  vol um es  of  l oans  and  deposi t s wh i l e severe r epression  wi l l  

















Fi gure  1
The  M ono-Bank  M odel : Lendi ng  Rat e Ce i l i ng
I n t he above simp l e m odel ,   alt hough t he deposi t   r ate i s f i xed,   t he vol um e of  deposi t s vari es as a 
r esult  of changes in ot her det ermi nant s of the suppl y of deposi t s to t he bank i . e. num ber of 
branches and ma r ket i ng acti vi t y.     Ne v e r t hel ess,  al l ow i ng t he deposi t   r ate t o vary does not   alt er 
t he qual i t ati ve nat ure of  t he eff ects   of  a l endi ng r ate ceil i ng on f i nanci al  deepening.     Thi s   can be 
achieved by i nt r oduci ng t he deposi t   r ate i n t he deposi t   coll ecti on t echnol ogy.   We   show  i n t he 
A ppendi x t hat   wi t h f l exibl e deposi t   r ates t he m ono-bank  wi l l   mi ni mi s e t he  cost   of  coll ecti ng  any 
gi ven  l evel  of  deposi t s by  choosi ng  t he  opt i ma l   mi x  bet w een deposi t -rate and  ma r ket i ng  acti vi t y.  
At   t he ma r gi n,   t he cost  of  coll ecti ng an addi t i onal   dol l ar  of  deposi t s by r aising t he i nt erest  r ate 
shoul d equal   t he cost  of  r aising t he extr a dol l ar  t hrough addit i onal   ma r ket i ng expendi t ure.  On c e  
again,  the m ono-bank wi l l   r espond t o l endi ng r ate ceil i ngs by r aising t he vol um e of  bot h l oans 
and deposi t s.  T he latt er wi l l  now  com e fr om  a com binat i on of  a r i se i n t he deposi t   r ate and 














Fi gure  2
The  M ono-Bank  M odel :   An  i ncrease  i n  t he  deposi t   rate
Thus,   t he bank wi l l   engi neer  bot h a shif t   i n t he suppl y of  deposi t s as we l l   as a m ovem ent   along 
t he  curve.
The  sam e f r am ew ork all ow s us also t o exam ine t he sensit i vi t y of  f i nanci al  deepening t o changes 
i n t he l evel of the adm i ni stered deposi t  rate w hen a lendi ng rate ceil i ng i s also present.  Such 
centr all y det ermi ned changes we r e qui t e f r equent   i n Sout h Ko r ea.    I n m any cases i ncreases i n 
deposi t  rates w ere int erpreted as aimi ng t o i ncrease the rol e of the m arket  in t he fi nanci al
system
9.     I n  t he  A ppendi x  we   show   t hat   an i ncrease i n  t he  adm ini stered deposi t   r ate l eads t o  an 
i ncrease i n t he i nt ercept  and a decrease i n  t he  slope  of  t he  ma r gi nal   cost  schedul e.  The  ma r gi nal  
cost  of  r aising an extr a dol l ar  of  deposi t s at  t he ori gi nal   equi l i bri um  l evel  of  l oans i s,  t herefore, 
l i kel y t o decl i ne
10.     Ho we v e r ,   wh e t her  t here i s any i ncrease i n l endi ng very mu c h   depends on
wh e t her  t he  dem and  f or  l oans  wa s   r ati oned  t o  start   wi t h.     I f   i t   wa s   not   r ati oned,   as i s t he  case i n 
Fi gure 2, the shi f t  in t he m argi nal  cost schedul e has no eff ect on t he vol um e of loans and 
deposi t s because of  t he di scont i nui t y i n t he ma r gi nal   r evenue schedul e ( depi cted by  t he  segm ent 
AB) .  Thi s sit uat i on i s capable of expl aini ng w hy,  under condi t i ons of regul ated lendi ng rates, 
f i nanci al  deepening  i s not   sensit i ve  t o  changes i n  t he  deposi t   r ate - a com m on  em pir i cal  f i ndi ng  i n 
f i nanci al  deepening  equat i ons  f or  devel opi ng  count r i es ( Ar esti s and  De me t r i ades,  1997).
3. 3.   The  Sout h  Korean  M odel
The m ono-bank m odel ,  in spi t e of it s simp l i cit y,  cont ains el em ents that  accord w el l  wi t h t he 
Sout h K orean experi ence.  Im port antl y,  the presence of a bank cart el that  stepped i n t o f i x 
i nt erest  r ates w henever  t he authori t i es r elaxed t hei r   cont r ol   over  l endi ng or  deposi t   r ates i s we l l  
9  See  Ha r r i s ( 1988)  and  Wo r d  Bank  ( 1989).
10  I t   ma y   hel p  t he  r eader  t o  t hi nk  of  t he  analogy  wi t h  f i xed  f actors of  product i on  i n  t he  short-r un;   a  r i se i n  t he 
vol um e  of  t he  f i xed  f actor  i s l i kel y  t o  all ow   a  mo r e  eff i cient  i nput   mi x  so t hat   ma r gi nal   cost  decli nes.9
docum ent ed
11.     The  m odel   i s part i cularl y r elevant  under  t he assum pti on of  f i xed deposi t   r ates, 
as t hese r em ained under  t he f orma l   cont r ol   of t he s t ate unt i l   t he l ate eight i es  and i nforma l l y s o 
unt i l   r ecentl y.   As   a r esult ,   t he m ono-bank  m odel ,   under  t he  assum pti ons  of  adm ini stered deposi t  
r ates and varyi ng degrees of  state cont r ol ,   can provi de t he basi s f or  f r ui t f ul   analysi s.  The  l att er 
has  i mp l i cati ons f or  t he extent  t o wh i ch t he bank cart el  coul d aim  f or  profi t   ma x i mi sati on.   Even 
t hough t he cart el  stepped i n t o f i x i nt erest  r ates w henever  t he governm ent   r elaxed i nt erest  r ate 
cont r ol s ,   i t   wa s   r arely,   i f   ever,   t ot all y f r ee t o aim  f or  ma x i mu m  m onopol y profi t .   A ccordi ng t o 
Par k  and  Ki m  ( 1994),“. . . duri ng  t he  mo s t   r epressive  peri od  …  t he  c o mme r cial  banks  we r e l i t t l e 
mo r e than governm ent  agencies delegated the t asks of m obi l i zing savi ngs and al l ocati ng t hem  
accordi ng  t o  di r ecti ves  and  gui del i nes  i ssued by  t he  governm ent " ( p. 215).
A b r i ef hi stori cal overvi ew  of the Sout h K orean banki ng system  reveals that  it  wa s  b r ought  
under  t i ght   governm ent   cont r ol   i n t he earl y 1960’s t hrough t he nat i onal i sati on of  all   c o mme r cial 
banks.  At  the sam e t i me  t he Bank of Kor ea,  wh i ch unt i l   t hen enjoyed i ndependence f r om  t he 
state,  wa s   subj ugat ed t o  t he  Mi ni str y  of  Fi nance  ( Par k  and  Ki m,   1994).   The  cont r ol   of  t he  state 
over c o mme r cial banki ng cont i nued unabat ed, extendi ng t o t he creati on of speciali sed banks 
and ot her banki ng i nst i t ut i ons,   unt i l   t he earl y eight i es  wh e n   t he governm ent   began t o di vest   i t s  
hol di ngs i n c o mme r cial  banks.     Si nce 1982,   c o mme r cial  banks have,   i n t heory,   been all ow ed t o 
operate as pri vat ely ow ned i nst i t ut i ons and have been subj ect t o l ess governm ent  c ont r ol .
Ho we v e r ,   even aft er  pri vat i sati on and t he r elaxati on of  f orma l   cont r ol s,  t he state has been able 
t o exert  consi derable informa l  cont r ol  over int erest rates and credit  all ocati on (A m sden and 
Euh,  1993;  Par k and K i m,  1994;  Da l l a and K hatkhat e, 1994)
12.   G radual l y,  though,  the 
c o mme r cial  banks  began  t o  enjoy  mo r e f r eedom   over  bot h  i nt erest  r ates and  credit   all ocati on  as 
a r esult   of  cont i nued eff ort s t ow ards f i nanci al  l i berali sati on wh i ch began duri ng t he l ate eight i es 
and  culmi nat ed i n  t he  1993  l i beral i sati on  progra mme .
The  pri vat i sati on of  t he banki ng system  i n t he earl y eight i es,  f ol l ow ed by t he gradual   r elaxati on 
of  governm ent   cont r ol   over  i nt erest  r ates,  clearl y i ncreased t he scope of  t he bank cart el  t o aim 
f or  ma x i mu m  m onopol y profi t ,   r est r i cti ng  out put   and  r aising  i nt erest  r ate spreads.    The  evidence 
on i nt erest  r ate spreads i s i n f act  support i ve of  t hi s conj ecture,  show i ng a gradual   i ncrease i n 
t hese spreads duri ng t he eight i es and earl y ni net i es ( Par k and Ki m,   1994).     I n t hi s cont ext  i t   i s, 
11 For   exam ple,  f ol l ow i ng  t he  part i al  deregul ati on  of  l endi ng  r ates  i n  1979  t he  Ko r ean  Bankers A ssociati on 
me t   t o  f i x  i nt erest  r ates  ( Bank  of  Ko r ea  A nnual   Report   1979,   p. 18).   See  also Par k  and  Ki m  ( 1994).
12 Si mi l ar  vi ew s  are  also expressed by  Par k  ( 1994)  w ho  poi nt s out   t hat   wh i l st  i nt erest  r ates  are  now   set  by  t he 
bank  cart el,   t he  m onet ary  authori t i es ma i nt ain  an att i t ude  of   ‘benign  negl ect’ onl y  as  l ong  as  t hey  t hi nk  t hat  
t hese  rates  are  reasonabl e  –  ot herwi se t hey  have  t he  l everage  t o  change  t hem .10
t herefore,  r easonabl e t o post ul ate t hat   t he degree of  state cont r ol   over  t he banki ng system  wa s  
i nversely related to t he abi l i t y of the banki ng system  to operate as a profi t  ma x i mi sing cart el.  
Thus,   one w oul d expect  t o observe a posi t i ve associati on bet w een t he degree of  state cont r ol  
over  t he  banki ng  system  and  t he  l evel  of  f i nanci al  devel opm ent .  
Thi s sit uat i on i s i l l ust r ated i n Fi gure 3 wh e r e poi nt   A  r epresents t he equi l i bri um  posi t i on of  t he 
banki ng system  under  a vol um e ma x i mi sing obj ecti ve ( subj ect  t o a no  l oss const r aint ) .     Poi nt   B,  
on  t he  ot her  hand,   r epresents t he  equi l i bri um   posi t i on  t hat   w oul d  be  chosen  by  a bank  cart el  i f   i t  
we r e fr ee to m axi mi se profi t .  I nt erme d i ate poi nt s coul d be t hought  of as representi ng
















Fi gure  3
The  M ono-Bank  M odel :   Vol um e  Ma x i mi sing  v.  Pr of i t   Ma x i mi sing
4.   M odel   Specif i cati on  and  Econom et ric Issues
Ou r   econom et r i c m odel   i s closel y l i nked t o t he m odel   of  t he Ko r ean banki ng sector  out l i ned i n 
t he previous secti on.   We   f i r st  specif y a f i nanci al  dept h equat i on t hat   all ow s us t o shed new  l i ght  
on t he eff ects of fi nanci al restr aint s on t he fi nanci al devel opm ent  of Sout h K orea. We  t hen 
di scuss esti ma t i on  i ssues.
Fi nanci al   developm ent
On e  s i mp l e predicti on of our analysi s  is  that  the i m posi t i on of a lendi ng rate ceil i ng at  an 
appropri ate l evel  wi l l   have a posi t i ve eff ect  on f i nanci al  devel opm ent .   Ou r   analysi s also suggest s 
t hat   i n t he presence of  deposi t   r ate cont r ol s-   t hese we r e i n pl ace i n Ko r ea unt i l   1988 - banks 
ma y  s t i l l  be abl e to i nfl uence t he vol um e of bank deposi t s through m arket i ng,  branching and 
r elated acti vi t i es.    A  r elated predicti on i s t hat   even i n t he presence of  bot h l endi ng and deposi t  11
r ate cont r ol s,  t he vol um e of  bank l oans ( and deposi t s)  ma y   sti l l   vary  accordi ng  t o  t he  degree of 
state cont r ol   over  t he banki ng system .  Specif i call y,   under  mi l d r epression of  l endi ng r ates,  t he 
ma i n predicti on of our analysi s  is  that  fi nanci al rest r aint s  wi l l  have a posi t i ve i m pact on t he 
vol um e of bank l oans.   To test thi s predicti on,  we  i ncl ude a sum m ary m easure of fi nanci al 
r estr aint s i n  t he  f i nanci al  devel opm ent   equat i on.     Al ongsi de,   we   also i ncl ude  t he  r eal  deposi t   r ate 
and t he l evel  of  r eal  i ncom e t hat   are norma l l y expected t o i nfl uence t he suppl y of  bank deposi t s 
t ot he banki ng system .    We   expect  t he l att er  t o have a posi t i ve eff ect  on f i nanci al  deepening,  
capturi ng t he dem and-si de r elati onshi p bet w een f i nanci al  devel opm ent   and econom i c acti vi t y
13.
U nder  f r ee ma r ket   condi t i ons,   t he f orme r   i s also,  norma l l y,   expected t o  i nfl uence  f i nanci al  dept h 
posi t i vel y.   Ho we v e r ,   i n t he presence of  deposi t   r ate r estr i cti ons,   vari ati on i n t he ( adm ini stered) 
r eal  r ate of  i nt erest  i s unl i kel y t o be a signi f i cant  det ermi nant   of  f i nanci al  dept h f or  t wo   r easons.
Fi r stl y,   t he r estr i cti ons on t he nom i nal   deposi t   r ate ma k e   i t   i m possibl e f or  banks t o use i t   as an 
i nst r um ent   f or  acti ve l i abil i t y m anagem ent .   I nst ead,  as we   have argued,   banks are l i kel y t o use 
ot her  me t hods t o i nfl uence t he vol um e of  deposi t s.    Second,   as we   have show n i n secti on 3,   i n 
t he presence of  a l endi ng r ate ceil i ng vari ati ons i n t he adm ini stered deposi t   r ate are unl i kel y t o 
i ncrease the dem and for loanabl e funds by t he banki ng system .  Thus,  the l i nk bet w een the 
( adm ini stered) deposi t  r ate and the vol um e of deposi t s raised by t he banki ng system  is 
w eakened by t he presence of  a l endi ng r ate ceil i ng.   For ma l   cont r ol s on l endi ng r ates persisted 
unt i l   1978  i n  Sout h  Ko r ea wh i l e l ess   f orma l   ones  cont i nued  unt i l   t he  mi d-ni net i es.
U nder  t he  above  assum pti ons  t he  equat i on  f or  f i nanci al  devel opm ent   can be  expressed as:
Lt    =  µ  +  θ1y t  +θ2r t  +  θ3FRt  +    e t ( 1)
wh e r eL  i s   an i ndi cator  of  f i nanci al  dept h,  yt he l ogari t hm  of  per  capit a realoutput ,r  i s   t he  r eal 
deposi tr ate of int erest and FR  is  an indi cator of fi nanci al restr aint s, w hich stands for the 
presence of a lendi ng rate ceil i ng or a  s u mma r y m easure of fi nanci al restr aint s. N ote t hat   t hi s 
m odel   nest s t he Mc Ki nnon/ Shaw  hypot hesi s as a special  case i n wh i ch θ2i s   posi t i ve and θ3i s
zero gi ven t hat  i n t hi s  f r am ew ork fi nanci al r est r aint s  w oul d aff ect fi nanci al deepening onl y
t hrough  i t s i nfl uence  on  t he  r eal  i nt erest  r ate. 
Gi ven t hat   t he above specif i cati on i s based on a num ber  of  assum pti ons,   i ncl udi ng t he presence 
of  mi l d r epression of  i nt erest  r ates,  i t   i s i m port ant  t o check f or  mi s-specif i cati on and str uct ural 
breaks.  Specif i call y,   we   check f or  non-l i near  eff ects t hat   w oul d i ndi cate t he presence of  severe 
f i nanci al repression,  by ent eri ng t he square of the fi nanci al restr aint s index i n t he equat i on.  
A ccordi ng t o our  m odel ,   t he l evel  t erm  shoul d enter  posi t i vel y wh i l e t he square t erm  ma y   enter 
13  Thi s i s a  standard  em pir i cal  f i ndi ng.     See,  f or  exam ple,  De me t r i ades  and  H ussein  ( 1996).12
wi t h a negat i ve sign under  severe r epression of  l endi ng r ates.  The  checks f or  non-l i neari t y are 
f ol l ow ed by t hree sets of t ests for str uct ural breaks, wh i ch are li nked t o t hree dif f erent
l i berali s ati on epi s odes:  i )  t he el i mi nat i on of f orma l  l endi ng rate contr ol s  i n 1979 i i )  t he
l i berali s ati on of t he m i d-ei ght i es ii i )  t he relaxati on of forma l  deposi t  rate contr ol s in 1988.  
A ccordi ng t o our  m odel ,   t he r elati onshi p bet w een f i nanci al  deepening and t he r eal  i nt erest  r ate 
shoul d be str engt hened wh e n   i nt erest  r ates becom e ma r ket -determi ned.     Ho we v e r ,   i t   mu s t   be 
borne i n m i nd t hat  even aft er the relaxati on of forma l  cont r ol s on i nt erest rates, the K orean 
authori t i es  ma i nt ained i nforma l   cont r ol s ,   t hat   we r e f acil i t ated by t he cont i nued presence of  state 
cont r ol   over  t he  banki ng  system  ( Ams d e n   and  Euh,   1993).  
5.   M easurem ent  and  Da t a  Sources
Fi nanci al   Res t raint s
We   const r uct   m easures of  f i nanci al  r estr aint s by ut i l i s i ng i nforma t i on f r om  annual   r eport s  of  t he 
Bank of Ko r ea pert aini ng t o i nt erest rate contr ol s and reserve requi r em ents.  We  r ecordt wo
t ypes of  i nt erest  r ate cont r ol s:  a ceil i ng on t he deposi t   r ate ( DRC)   and a ceil i ng on t he l endi ng 
r ate ( LRC) .     These cont r ol s are m easured by dum m y  vari ables t hat   t ake t he  val ue  1  i f   a cont r ol  
i s present  and 0 ot herwi se.  Da t a on t he r equi r ed r eserve r ati os on t i me   deposi t s ( RRTD)   and 
dem and  deposi t s ( RRDD)   are also coll ected. 
Al t hough i t   i s   t em pti ng t o use all   t he cont r ol s   i n equat i ons  of  f i nanci al  dept h i n order  t o  esti ma t e 
t hei r  i ndi vi dual  eff ects, t he hi gh corr elati on am ong t hese cont r ol s m ay render param eter
est i ma t es  i mp r ecis e.  On   t he ot her  hand,   usi ng t hem  i ndi vi dual l y ma y   r esul t   i n om i t t ed vari ables 
s i nce the aut hori t i es si mu l t aneousl y i m pose all  or mo s t  of these cont r ol s. Thus,  w e const r uct  
s u mma r y m easures of  f i nanci al  r est r aint s  eit herut i l i s i ng (a) the me t hod of  pri nci pal   com ponent s
and ( b)  simp l e ari t hm et i c averaging aft er  standardi sati on ( see De me t r i ades and Lui nt el  1996a,  
1996b,   1997).
Al l  f our posi t i vel y corr elated pol i cy m easures are standardi sed to m ean zero and st andard 
devi ati on of  uni t y and t hen used t o com put e ( a)  pri nci pal   com ponent s ( b)  a simp l e ari t hm et i c 
average.    The  l att er  i n i t self   const i t ut es a s u mma r y m easure of  f i nanci al  r estr ai nt s ( FR2) .     The 
pri nci pal   com ponent s analysi s r esult s i n four  pri nci pal   com ponent s,  t he f i r st  of  wh i ch account s
f or onl y 67%  of  the vari ati on of the four pol i cy vari ables.  We   t herefore com put e a su mma r y
m easure( FR1)whi ch is  the we i ght ed average of  all  f our  pri nci pal   com ponent s.  The  we i ght s  
corr espond t o t he proport i on of  vari ance expl ained,   i . e.  t he f i r s t   pri nci pal   com ponent   i s   gi ven a 13
we i ght  of 67% . The corr elati ons bet w een each of t he t wo  s u mma r y m easures and the
underl yi ng  f i nanci al  r est r aint s   are very  str ong,   r angi ng  f r om   0. 6  t o  0. 94.  
Fi nanci al   De p t h
We  u t i l i se two  i ndi cators of fi nanci al dept h.   The fi r st one i s the rati o of c o mme r cial bank 
deposi t s to nom i nal  GDP.   Thi s is a fair l y st andard m easure of fi nanci al dept h.  We  a l so 
const r uct  a second,  broader,  indi cator of fi nanci al dept h w hi ch, in addi t i on t o bank deposi t s 
also incl udes t he deposi t  l i abil i t i es of ot her f i nanci al i nst i t ut i ons,  post al savings banks and
devel opm ent  banks.   The dat a requi r ed to const r uct  t hese i ndi cators w ere obt ained f r om  
I nt ernat i onal  Fi nanci al  St at i sti cs (I FS,  vari ous i ssues) publ i shed by t he Int ernat i onal
M onet ary  Fund
14.
Ot her  Da t a
The  t i me   seri es on CPI ,   nom i nal   GDP,   r eal  GDP  and popul ati on w ere also obt ained f r om  t he 
sam e source
15.     The s i x-m ont h deposi tand general  lendi ng r ates are obt ained f r om  Bank of  
Korea Annual  Report (vari ous i ssues).  The r eal rate of int erest is m easured on an ex-ante
basi s, by subt r acti ng t he l agged rate of infl ati on fr om  t he curr ent deposi t  rate on 6 m ont h-
deposi t s. The per capit a seri es for real GDP  i s calculated by divi di ng t he corr espondi ng
aggregate seri es by popul ati on.
6.   Empi rical  Re s ul t s
Equat i on 1 i s esti ma t ed ut i l i sing bot h m easures of  f i nanci al  devel opm ent ;   L 1  and L2denot e t he 
narr ow  and broad m easure of  f i nanci al  dept h,   r especti vel y.   I n  t erms   of  explanatory  vari ables,  i n 
addi t i on t o t hose i n equat i on ( 1),   wh i ch r epresent  t he l ong-run det ermi nant s of  f i nanci al  dept h,  
we  a l so incl ude a l agged dependent  vari able to capture dynam i cs (and prevent dynam i c m is-
specif i cati on).     As   f ar  as esti ma t i on me t hod i s concerned,   because of  t he l i kel y endogenei t y of 
r eal  GDP  per  capit a,  we   use I nst r um ent al  Va r i ables
16.   The  i nst r um ent s chosen f or  t hi s vari able 
are the l ogari t hm  of real export s per capit a (x) and t he change i n t he l ogari t hm  of the capit al
stock  per  capit a ( k).  
14  Bank  deposi t s are  defi ned  as  t he  sum  of  l i nes  24  and  25.     The  broad  m easure  i s t he  di f f erence  bet w een 
t ot al  l i qui d  l i abil i t i es  ( l i ne  55l )   and  curr ency  i n  cir culati on  ( l i ne  24a).
15  CPI :   Li ne  64;   nom i nal   GDP:   l i ne  99b;   r eal  GDP:   l i ne  99b. p;   popul ati on:   l i ne  99z.
16  We   have  also checked  f or  the possibl e  endogenei t y  of  t he  real  deposi t   rate  usi ng  t he  H ausm an  t est.     The 
nul l   of  non- simu l t aneit y  coul d  not   be  r ejected.  Thi s i s not   surpri sing  gi ven  t hat   t he  r eal  deposi t   r ate  wa s  
cont roll ed  by  t he  authori t i es.14
Thr ee sets of  r esult s f or  each m easure of  f i nanci al  devel opm ent   are r eport ed i n Tabl e 1.   M odel  
A  uses t he we i ght ed pri nci pal   com ponent   i ndex ( FR1) .  Ou r   m odel   predicts t hat   a mi l d l endi ng 
r ate ceil i ng i ncreases t he suppl y of  credit .   M odel   B t ests t hi s predicti on by enteri ng t he l endi ng 
r ate ceil i ng ( LRC)   as  t he onl y f i nanci al  r est r aint   i n t he f i nanci al  devel opm ent   equat i on.   Fi nal l y,   i n 
m odel   C  we   esti ma t e t he  eff ects of  t he  second  s u mma r y  m easure of  f i nanci al  r estr aint s ( FR2) .
Exami ni ng  f i r s t l y  t he  r esul t s   usi ng  t he  pri nci pal   com ponents   m easure of  f i nanci al  r est r aint s   ( FR1) ,  
i t   can be  observed  t hat   t he  em pir i cal  perf orm ance of  M odel   A  i s hi ghl y  sati sfactory  i n  t hat   all   t he 
vari ables enter wi t h t he expect ed signs and,  wi t h t he excepti on of the real int erest rate, are 
stati sti call y signi f i cant.   Mo r eover,   t he esti ma t ed coeff i cients have pl ausibl e val ues,   t he esti ma t ed 
mo d e l   expl ains mo r e t han 95%  of  t he vari ati on i n t he dependent   vari able,  passes Sar gan’s t est 
of  t he val i di t y of  t he i nst r um ent s and t here i s no evidence of  seri al  corr elati on.   I m port antl y,   t he 
f i nanci al  r est r aint s   i ndex enters   wi t h a posi t i ve s i gn and i s   s i gni f i cant  wh i l e t he r eal  i nt erest   r ate i s  
not   signi f i cant;   bot h  t hese  f i ndi ngs  are consi stent  wi t h  our  t heoreti cal  predicti ons.
The  est i ma t ed coeff i cients   r eveal  a mu c h   mo r e pow erf ul   i nfl uence  of  t he  f i nanci al  r est r aint s   i ndex 
on f i nanci al  dept h com pared t o t he r eal  i nt erest  r ate.    Ca l culated at  t he m ean of  t he dependent  
vari able,  t he ma x i mu m  eff ect  of  t he f i nanci al  r est r aint s i ndex
17  i s 0. 13  or  66. 5% .   To  achieve t he 
sam e r esult   t hrough t he i nt erest  r ate an i ncrease of  over  42 percentage poi nt s i s r equi r ed ( even 
s ett i ng asi de t he i s s ue of  s t ati s t i cal  i nsi gni f i cance).     Sol vi ng t he m odel   f or  t he l ong r un r einforces 
t he above  concl usi ons since t he l ong-run  coeff i cients are about   t hree t i me s   as l arge  as t he  short -
r un ones.     Thus,   t he l ong-run i ncom e elast i cit y of  f i nanci al  devel opm ent   i s   1. 42,   s uggest i ng t hat  
f i nanci al dept h i s  a luxury good,  wh i l e the l ong-run i nt erest rate sem i-elasti cit y am ount s 0. 01,  
wh i ch is  in l i ne w i t h ot her st udi es.   Final l y,  the est i ma t ed long-run coeff i cient  of  t he f i nanci al 
r estr aint s i ndex  i s 0. 53.  
Exami ni ng t he result s for t he case w here the dependent  vari able is the broad m easure of
f i nanci al  dept h,   we   observe  som e changes i n  t he  m agni t udes  of  t he  esti ma t ed coeff i cients but   t he 
qual i t ati ve nat ure of the result s rem ains unal t ered. Im port antl y,  wh i l e the m easure of fi nanci al 
r estr aint s cont i nues t o have l arge posi t i ve and si gni f i cant eff ects, the ef f ect  of  t he r eal  i nt erest 
r ate r em ains  s ma l l   and  i nsi gni f i cant.   Thus,   we   concl ude  t hat   t he  r esul t s   ut i l i s i ng 
17  Thi s i s obt ained  by  f i ndi ng  t he  di f f erence  bet w een  t he  ma x i mu m  and  mi ni mu m  val ues  of  t he  i ndex  and 
mu l t i pl yi ng  i t   by  t he  esti ma t ed  coeff i cient  of  0. 15.15
Tabl e 1
Fi nanci al   D evelopm ent   M odel s
Sam pl e  peri od:  1956- 1994  (39  observati ons)
Instrum ental   Var i abl e  esti ma t i on  (Instrum ents f or  y t :   x t   ,   Dkt   )
M odel   A M odel   B M odel   C
D ependent   Va r i able D ependent   Va r i able D ependent   Va r i able
Re gr essorsL 1 L2 L1 L2 L1 L2











          ( 2. 333)
  Li ,t -1 0. 7177**
( 0. 0967)
      0. 7166**
      ( 0. 106)
0. 7116**
( 0. 1119)
        0. 6585**
      ( 0. 1239)
0. 7308**
( 0. 092)
          0. 6861**
          ( 0. 101)
  Yt 0. 3995*
( 0. 171)
      0. 4617**
      ( 0. 176)
0. 5130*
( 0. 2144)
        0. 4951**
      ( 0. 1969)
0. 3496*
( 0. 150)
            0. 4345**
          ( 0. 157)
      r t 0. 0032
( 0. 002)
      0. 0023
      ( 0. 002)
0. 0024
( 0. 0027)
        0. 0021
      ( 0. 0023)
0. 0030
( 0. 002)
          0. 0021
        ( 0. 002)
FR1t 0. 1508*
( 0. 064)
      0. 1358*
      ( 0. 060)
⎯ ⎯⎯⎯
LRC ⎯⎯ 0. 4955*
( 0. 2161)
        0. 2953
      ( 0. 1523)
⎯⎯
FR2t ⎯⎯⎯ ⎯ 0. 0439*
( 0. 0186)
          0. 0426*
        ( 0. 017) 
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1. Vari abl e defi ni t i ons: L 1 and  L2  are narr ow  and broad m easures of fi nanci al dept h respecti vel y.  FR1ti s
we i ght ed pri nci pal  com ponent  index of fi nanci al restr aint s; FR2t:   equal l y we i ght ed i ndex of  f i nanci al  r estr aint s; 
LRC:   i nt erest  r ate ceil i ng;   x:   t he  l ogari t hm   of  r eal  export s per  capit a.
2. D i agnost i cs:  AR( 1)  i s a Lagr ange Mu l t i pl i er  t est  f or  f i r st- order  seri al  corr elati on  di str i but ed as chi- square ( 1).  
Sar gan’s t est  i s a t est  of  t he val i di t y of  t he i nst r um ent s di str i but ed as chi- square ( 1).   The  f i r st  stabil i t y t est  i s a 
Wa l d  t est  f or  a str uct ural  break.  The  second  stabil i t y  t est  i s Chow ’s t est  f or  t he  stabil i t y  of  r egression  coeff i cients.
3. Fi gures in parentheses are standard err ors.  On e   and t wo   asteri sks denot e signi f i cance at  5%  and 1%  l evels 
r especti vel y.
4. A R(1)  and  Sar gan’s t ests are not   appl i cable t o  M odel   B,   t he  esti ma t es of  wh i ch are obt ained  aft er  corr ecti ng 
f or fi r st- order m ovi ng average err ors.  The D urbi n-Wa t son t est of the report ed esti ma t es suggest s no seri al 
corr elati on.16
t he pri nci pal  com ponent s m easure of fi nanci al restr aint s are consistent wi t h our t heoreti cal
predicti ons  and  are not   sensit i ve  t o  t he  m easurem ent  of  f i nanci al  dept h
18.
To  check r obust ness,  we   put   M odel   A  t hrough a seri es of  str uct ural  stabil i t y t ests.  Specif i call y,  
we   exam ine  t he  s t abil i t y  of  t he  m odel   f ol l ow i ng  i )   t he  r elaxati on  of  f orma l   deposi t   r ate cont r ol s   i n 
t he post -1988 peri od i i )   t he l i berali sati on of  t he mi d-ei ght i es  i i i )   t he r elaxati on of  f orma l   l endi ng
r ate cont r ol s i n t he post   1979 peri od.   I n vi ew  of  t he I V  esti ma t or  f ol l ow ed,   we   calculate t he 
Wa l d stati sti c versions of  t he Chow  t ests.  U nder  t he nul l   of  str uct ural  stabil i t y t he Wa l d t est  f or 
t he f i r st  peri od i s χ
2( 6)  di str i but ed;  f or  t he second peri od  i t   i s χ
2( 8)  and  f or  t he  t hi r d  peri od  i t   i s 
χ
2( 15)  di str i but ed.  The  em pir i cal  P-val ues r esum ed by t he Wa l d t ests under  t he nul l   are 0. 992,  
0. 822 and 0. 995 respecti vel y for the post -1988,  mi d-ei ght i es and post -1979 peri ods f or  t he 
narr ow  m easure of  f i nanci al  dept h;   t hey  are r especti vel y  0. 996,   0. 972  and  0. 998  f or  t he  broad 
m easure of fi nanci al dept h.  Thus,  Wa l d t ests cannot  reject the nul l  of no st r uct ural break for 
bot h m odel s. W e concl ude,  therefore, that  there is no evi dence of str uct ural inst abil i t y i n t he 
f i nanci al  deepening  equat i on.
M odel  B pr ovi des a simp l e test of the m ono-bank m odel .   The esti ma t es suggest  that  the 
l endi ng rate ceil i ng has a posi t i ve and si gni f i cant coeff i cient wh e r eas the real deposi t -rate i s 
i nsi gni f i cant.   B oth t hese fi ndi ngs are consistent wi t h t he predicti ons of the m ono-bank m odel  
presented i n Secti on 3.     These f i ndi ngs are i nsensi t i ve t o wh i ch of  t he t wo   m easures of  f i nanci al 
dept h  t hat   i s em ployed.     Fur t hermo r e,  t he  esti ma t ed equat i on  passes t he  sam e str uct ural  stabil i t y
t ests as M odel   A.       M odel   C  r epeats t he esti ma t i on ut i l i sing t he second s u mma r y m easure of 
f i nanci al  r est r aint s .     Wh i l e t here are nat urall y s om e s ma l l   changes  i n t he est i ma t ed coeff i cients 
com pared t o t hose obt ained f or  M odel   A,   t he qual i t ati ve nat ure of   t he  r esult s i s unal t ered.    The 
s u mma r y  m easure of  f i nanci al  r est r aint s   enters   wi t h  a posi t i ve  and  s i gni f i cant  coeff i cient  wh i l e t he 
r eal deposi t  rate rem ains st ati sti call y i nsi gni f i cant.   M odel  C  passes the sam e di agnost i c and 
str uct ural stabil i t y t ests as M odel  A.  Fi nal l y,  we  a l so checked for non-l i near eff ects of the 
f i nanci al  r estr aint s i ndex and t he r eal  i nt erest  r ate ( separately and j oi nt l y)  i n all   t hree m odel s t o 
exam ine t he poss i bi l i t y of  di f f erences  i n t he eff ects   of  ‘ mi l d’  and ‘ s evere’  f i nanci al  r epression
19.
We   have f ound t hese non-l i near  t erms   t o be hi ghl y i nsi gni f i cant.     To  concl ude,   t hese addi t i onal  
t ests of robust ness lend furt her support  to t he vi ew  that  in Sout h K orea the suppression of 
l endi ng r ates wa s   mi l d,   boost i ng f i nanci al  devel opm ent   by r educi ng  t he  abil i t y  of  t he  bank  cart el 
t o  act  as a profi t   ma x i mi sing  m onopol i st.  
18 In an earl i er version of thi s paper we  a l so used the fi r st pri nci pal  com ponent  of fi nanci al restr aint s, 
wi t hout   any  qual i t ati ve  changes  i n  t he  result s.17
7.   Conc l udi ng  Co mme n t s
The  t r adit i onal   approach of  analysi ng f i nanci al  r estr aint s i mp l i cit l y  t r eats   t he  banki ng  s yst em  as  a 
perf ectl y com peti t i ve i ndust r y t hat passivel yt r ansforms   deposi t s i nt o l oans at  zero cost.   As   a 
r esult ,e mp i r i cal tests of t he fi nanci al l i berali sati on hypot hesi s have t ended t o focus on t he 
ma r gi nal   eff ects   of  f i nanci al  pol i cies  t hrough changes  i n r eal  i nt erest   r ates  and have  i gnored t hei r  
pot enti al l y l arge eff ects through banks'  non-com pet i t i ve responses t o relaxati ons  of  f i nanci al 
r estr aint s.    I n t hi s paper  we   presented evidence f r om  Sout h Ko r ea wh i ch r obust l y show s t hat  
t he di r ect  eff ects of  f i nanci al  r estr aint s on fi nanci al  developm ent   we r e not   only  posi t i ve  but   als o 
qui t e l arge w hi l et he eff ects of changes i n t he r eal i nt erest  r ate we r e i nsi gni f i cant
20.     Thus,   t he 
basi c conclusi on of an enti r e li t erature m ay w ell  be reversed if  these di r ect pol i cy eff ects are 
t aken i nt o  account .
Fi nal l y,   a wo r d  of  cauti on  i s i n  order.   Even  t hough  our  r esult s r obust l y  show   t hat   i n  Sout h  Ko r ea 
governm ent   i nt ervent i on i n t he f i nanci al  s yst em  had posi t i ve eff ects   on f i nanci al  deepening duri ng 
t he esti ma t i on peri od,   t hi s need not   hol d t r ue i n ot her  count r i es or  i n ot her  peri ods.   The  success 
of  i nt ervent i oni st  pol i cies,  such as t hose  f ol l ow ed  by  t he  Sout h  Ko r ean authori t i es,  clearl y  hi nges 
upon i nst i t ut i onal  f actors, such as the st r engt h of t he ci vi l  servi ce and ot her governm ent
i nst i t ut i ons.  Fur t hermo r e, as has been clearl y show n i n t he t heoreti cal analysi s, r epressing
i nt erest  r ates t o l evels bel ow  t hose t hat   w oul d have been obt ained under  com peti t i ve condi t i ons 
i s   l i kel y t o backfi r e,  i m pacti ng negat i vel y on f i nanci al  deepening.   Ou r   cauti onary att i t ude i s ,   i n 
f act, support ed by our previous w ork on Indi a w hich dem onst r ates that  severe fi nanci al
r epression had si gni f i cant negat i ve eff ects on bot h fi nanci al deepening and econom i c grow t h 
( De me t r i ades and Lui nt el,   1997).   I f   any generali sati on i s at  all   possibl e f r om  t hese  cont r asti ng 
f i ndi ngs,   i t   mu s t   be  t hat   ma r ket   f ail ure does  not   guarantee governm ent   success.
19  These  result s are  not   report ed  here  but   are  avail able  from  t he  authors  on  request .
20  The  robust ness of  our  result s extends  t o  esti ma t i on  me t hods.     The  precursor  of  t he  present  paper 
( De me t r i ades  and  Lui nt el,   1996c)  f i nds  qual i t ati vel y  simi l ar  result s usi ng  coint egrati on  t echni ques.18
Appendi x
Consi der  a bank t hat   wi shes t o mi ni mi se t he cost,   C,   of  r aising deposi t s D  wh i ch consi sts of 
i nt erest  costs and ot her  expendi t ure.    The  l att er  coul d i ncl ude  staff   costs,  t he  costs of  r unni ng  a 
branch net wo r k,   ma r ket i ng expendi t ure etc;  f or  simp l i cit y we   r efer  t o t he acti vi t i es t hat   gi ve r i se 
t o all   t hese ot her  costs as ‘ ma r ket i ng’.   The  vol um e of  deposi t s t hat   can be r aised i s assum ed t o 
be  i ncreasing  i n  t he r ate of  i nt erest,   r ,   and  ma r ket i ng  expendi t ure.    For ma l l y,
) , ( h r D D =
wh e r e h  r epresents ma r ket i ng  expendi t ure per  pound  of    deposi t s.    We   assum e t hat   Dr>  0,   Dh>
0  ,   Dr r  <  0  and  Dhh  <  0.
Thus,   t he  bank  mi ni mi s es
hD rD D C + = ) (
subj ect  t o 
−
= D D   .   Thi s i s a standard opt i mi zati on probl em  t he f i r st  order  condi t i ons of  wh i ch 
r esult s in Dr /D h    = 1,   wh i ch suggest s t hat   at  t he ma r gi n t he benefi t   of  an addit i onal   cent  of 
ma r ket i ng expendi t ure per dol l ar of deposi t s m ust equal  the benefi t  of an addit i onal  cent of 
i nt erest  per  dol l ar  of  deposi t s.    To  proceed f urt her  we   now  assum e t hat   t he deposi t s f unct i on i s 
Cobb-Dougl as.    Specif i call y  we   assum e t hat
b ah Ar D =
wh e r eα  and β  are param eters bet w een 0 and 1.     I n r eali t y we   expect  t hat   t he f unct i on w oul d 
be  mo r e sensit i ve  t o  changes i n  r   t han  t o  changes i n  h  so t hat   α  i s greater  t han β.






wh i ch l ead t o  t he  f ol l ow i ng  opt i ma l   l evels   of  r   and  h  gi ven  D:
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wh i ch i s posi t i ve and i ncreasing i n D.     I f  α+β  i s   equal   t o  uni t y  t hen  t he  ma r gi nal   cost   f unct i on  i s  
l i near,   suggest i ng t he presence of  const ant  r eturns t o t he t wo   i nput s,  wh i l e i f   i t   i s l ess ( greater)  
t han  uni t y  i t   i s convex  ( concave)  corr espondi ng  t o  t he  case of   decreasing  ( i ncreasing)  r eturns.
Consi der  now  t he case wh e r e t he authori t i es f i x t he deposi t   r ate at  som e l evel  .
−
= r r   Then  t he 
probl em  of t he bank i s tr i vi al:  i t  chooses t he l evel of h t hat  achieves the requi r ed level of
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Thi s   i s   clearl y i ncreasi ng and,   gi ven t hat   β  i s l ess t han  uni t y,   convex  i n  D.     To  show   t he  eff ect  of 
an i ncrease i n t he adm ini stered deposi t   r ate we   now  di f f erenti ate t hi s f unct i on wi t h r espect  t o r  
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For  sm all  val ues of D t hi s expression i s clearl y posi t i ve.   Ho we v e r ,  for suff i cientl y l arge D  i t  
t urns negat i ve.   As   a r esult ,   an i ncrease i n t he adm ini stered deposi t   r ate wi l l   t i l t   t he ma r gi nal   cost 
f unct i on,   i ncreasing i t s i nt ercept  but   r educi ng i t s slope.   I nt ui t i vel y,   t he i ncreased deposi t   r ate has 
t w o opposi ng eff ects: it  ma k e s  t he i nt erest cost of funds hi gher but  it  also reduces the non-
i nt erest  cost  by  all ow i ng  a bet t er  mi x  of  i nt erest  r ate and  ma r ket i ng  acti vi t i es.    At   l arge  val ues  of 
D,   t he  ma r gi nal   cost  of  f unds  wi l l   decli ne  because ma r ket i ng  i s subject  t o  di mi ni s hi ng  r eturns  and 
t he  r elaxati on  of  t he  i nt erest  r ate const r aint   all ow s  t he  bank  t o  r educe ma r ket i ng  expendi t ure. 20
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